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Calculating Corporate Compliance & The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 




 Technology is rapidly disrupting every industry and institution around the globe. Yet, corporate 
compliance has remained relatively unaffected by technological change when compared to other 
industries. If firms continue to lag behind in their compliance efforts, their risk exposure to the potentially 
lethal sanctions associated with major compliance failures will continue to increase with time. This is 
particularly true in the context of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Generally, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) is a regulatory statute that forbids bribery and false accounting for domestic 
firms doing business abroad. And, in the past decade the DOJ and SEC have begun aggressively enforcing 
the FCPA. Firms should begin using technology to develop more robust and cost-efficient compliance 
programs to insulate themselves from the FCPA’s harsh penalties. 
 This Article provides an algorithm that allows firms to evaluate and improve their compliance 
programs in accordance with several published sources of guidance. Compliance scholars have made 
clear that it is critical for firms to maintain strong corporate compliance programs and have suggested 
different models and frameworks for internal evaluation and auditing. However, those suggestions fail to 
consider how technology may be used to improve the cost-efficiency of corporate compliance and ethics 
programs. This Article takes an informatics-based approach to evaluating and improving firm compliance 
by focusing on the most important compliance functions according to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
courts, and other Government actors. Indeed, firms may drastically improve the cost-efficiency of their 
compliance efforts by adopting the analytical framework proposed in this Article. 
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Calculating Corporate Compliance & The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
Brian S. Haney* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) are aggressively enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) 
against corporations engaged in international business.1 The FCPA was signed into 
law in 19782 and has two main purposes. First, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions 
make it unlawful for certain classes of entities to make payments to foreign 
government officials to assist in obtaining business.3 Second, the FCPA’s accounting 
provisions require companies whose securities are listed in the United States to 
(a) make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions of the corporation and (b) devise and maintain an adequate system of 
internal controls.4 
Interestingly, in the 23-year period from 1978 through 2000, there were only a 
total of 50 enforcement actions brought under the FCPA.5 However, in 2001 
prosecutions began skyrocketing.6 From 2001 through 2006, there were a total of 63 
enforcement actions brought under the statute.7 From 2007 through 2017, the trend 
in enforcement continued to accelerate.8 Indeed, during this ten-year period there 
                                                          
* Brian Haney, Esq., J.D. Notre Dame Law School 2018. Thanks to Professor Veronica Root for 
the mentorship inspiring this Article. Thanks also to Professor John Ross and Professor Kathleen Rice 
Mosier for the helpful comments and constructive criticisms. 
1 Veronica Root, The Outsized Influence of the FCPA?, 2018 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209510. 
2 Id. at 21. 
3 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (West 1998). 
4 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 1978). 
5 STAN. L. SCH., Foreign Corrupt Practices Clearinghouse: A Collaboration with Sullivan & 
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were a total of 405 enforcement actions brought under the statute.9 The graph below 
charts the number of combined prosecutions under the FCPA by the DOJ and SEC: 
10 
FCPA prosecutions are commonly accompanied by heavy fines. The SEC and 
DOJ collected roughly $10 billion in fines under the FCPA from 1978 through 
2017.11 Additionally, there have been 94 cases of fines levied in excess of $10 million 
dollars against individual violators.12 The table below graphs the total monetary 
sanctions imposed on organizations under the FCPA by year in U.S. Dollars; the 
values are adjusted for inflation: 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Brian S. Haney, FCPA Clearinghouse (2018) (the information contained in this chart was 
prepared by the author with information from Stanford University’s FCPA website as a research assistant 
for Professor Veronica Root) (on file with author). See also Appendix A for complete table of FCPA 
prosecutions by year; id. 
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The total monetary sanctions recovered per year mirrors the DOJ and SEC’s pattern 
of increased enforcement. Indeed, over $9 billion of the roughly $10 billion 
recovered under the 39-year life of the statute was recovered between 2007 and 
2017.14 Both the rate of growth in the number of prosecutions and the total monetary 
sanctions imposed under the FCPA are trending up at an accelerating rate.15 As a 
result of heavy fines and penalties associated with these increased prosecution 
efforts, companies have been forced to change the way they approach compliance 
and ethics.16 Now compliance is king, and its subjects, regulators, prosecutors, 
courts, and corporations, are quick to tout its power for potential good.17 
The growing importance of FCPA compliance is unsurprising given the 
emphasis that governmental actors, like the DOJ and SEC, place on the need for 
institutions to adopt effective compliance programs.18 Indeed, the DOJ has made 
                                                          
13 Inflation rates were calculated using an online inflation calculator. See Inflation Calculator, 
SAVING.ORG, https://www.saving.org/inflation/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). See also Brian S. Haney, 
FCPA Clearinghouse (2018) (the information contained in this chart was prepared by the author with 
information from Stanford University’s FCPA website as a research assistant for Professor Veronica Root) 
(on file with author); id. 
14 Inflation Calculator, supra note 13; STAN. L. SCH., supra note 5. 
15 STAN. L. SCH., supra note 5. 
16 Root, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21). 
17 Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2017). 
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explicitly clear that prosecution of corporate crime is a high priority.19 And, the DOJ 
has explained that prosecution of corporate crime is a vital element of protecting the 
public interest.20 For example, in 2014 the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Department of Justice’s Criminal Division explained that the work of compliance 
officials serves to protect the integrity of our public markets, the country’s financial 
systems, intellectual property, and taxpayer dollars.21 Therefore, corporations have 
begun to focus on strengthening their internal compliance programs.22 To illustrate, 
in 2014 the President and CEO of Walmart Stores, in the midst of a stunning bribery 
scandal, discussed the company’s goal to become the model of excellence in global 
compliance and ethics.23 Further, the President and CEO of Walmart International 
explained that “[a]s a global company, we have responsibilities to the countries in 
which we operate. We earn trust through our commitment to compliance.”24 
A corporation engaged in FCPA misconduct can be sure regulators will point 
to an ineffective compliance program as a cause of misconduct.25 However, 
developing a robust compliance program poses problems for many firms because, in 
short, compliance is a complicated, time consuming, and expensive process.26 This 
Article presents an algorithm firms may use to improve the cost-efficiency of their 
compliance programs, proceeding in three parts. Part I explores various sources of 
guidance for evaluating compliance programs. Part II introduces an algorithm firms 
may use to measure compliance programs quantitatively. Part III explains how the 
algorithm introduced in Part II can be used by firms to improve the quality and cost-
efficiency of their compliance programs. 
                                                          
19 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.000 - Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, JUSTICE.GOV, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-
principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
20 Id. 
21 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-
caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics). 
22 Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, The Mystery of Declinations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: A Proposal to Incentivize Compliance, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 571 (2015). 
23 Root, supra note 17, at 1005. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1003. 
26 Tom Butler et al., Beyond the Hype of AI: A Smart Approach to Unpacking Regulations, 36 NO. 
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I. SOURCES OF GUIDANCE 
The Government has made multiple resources available to corporations 
interested in developing robust compliance programs. First, the DOJ provides 
guidance on how agency officials evaluate compliance programs in the Evaluation 
of Corporate Compliance Programs Memo (“DOJ Memo”).27 The DOJ Memo 
provides a list of eleven factors, known as the Filip Factors, that the DOJ may 
consider when evaluating corporate compliance programs. The eleven factors are: 
1) Analysis and Remediation of Underlying Misconduct; 
2) Senior and Middle Management; 3) Autonomy and 
Resources; 4) Policies and Procedures; 5) Risk 
Assessment; 6) Training and Communications; 
7) Confidential Reporting and Investigation; 
8) Incentives and Disciplinary Measures; 9) Continuous 
Improvement, Periodic Testing and Review; 10) Third 
Party Management; and 11) Mergers and Acquisitions.28 
The DOJ Memo describes each of the Filip Factors in further detail by listing several 
questions the DOJ considers under each factor in its overall evaluation of corporate 
compliance and ethics programs.29 However, the DOJ Memo specifically states that 
“[b]ecause a corporate compliance program must be evaluated in the specific context 
of a criminal investigation that triggers the applications of the Filip Factors, the Fraud 
Section does not use any rigid formula to assess the effectiveness of corporate 
compliance programs.”30 Therefore, it is important for firms to draw on multiple 
sources of guidance in constructing their compliance programs. 
Second, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(“Principles of Prosecution”) provide guidance for companies regarding the DOJ’s 
expectations for corporate compliance programs.31 The Principles of Prosecution 
explain that federal prosecutors should consider “the existence and effectiveness of 
the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” when deciding whether to 
charge a corporation or negotiating a settlement agreement.32 It is important to note 
that when under investigation by the DOJ, “the existence of a compliance program 
                                                          
27 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, https://www.justice 
.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download (2017). 
28 Id. at 1–7. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1. 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
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is not sufficient to justify not charging a corporation for criminal conduct.”33 
However, prosecutors and courts consider the existence of such programs in 
determining whether the employee engaged in misconduct acted in accordance with 
the will of the firm or independently.34 Therefore, firms are able to insulate 
themselves from potential lethal liability under the FCPA by implementing and 
maintaining effective compliance programs.35 
Further, the Principles of Prosecution provide detailed guidance on what 
constitutes an effective compliance program.36 The Principles of Prosecution state 
that two critical factors in evaluating compliance programs are 1) whether the 
program is designed to maximize effectiveness in preventing and detecting 
wrongdoing by employees; and 2) whether corporate management is enforcing the 
program or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business 
objectives.37 Additionally, prosecutors will consider the design of the compliance 
program, whether the program is maintained in good faith, and the 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the compliance program when making 
prosecution and settlement decisions.38 Therefore, one important task for prosecutors 
is to determine whether a corporation’s compliance program is merely a “paper 
program.”39 As a result, firms must make sure that their policies and procedures 
accurately describe the way in which their employees behave. And, it is critical 
compliance officials work with employees when writing policies and procedures to 
ensure organizational policies and procedures are well understood and followed. 
A third source of guidance for compliance programs is the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (“Sentencing Guidelines”), which are 
applied by prosecutors when sentencing organizations.40 The Sentencing Guidelines 
specifically state that “the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program” 
is a factor that will mitigate the ultimate punishment of a defendant.41 In defining an 
                                                          
33 Id. § 0-28.800. 
34 United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979). 
35 Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 775, 806 (2011). 
36 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
37 Id. § 9-28.800. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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“effective compliance program” the Sentencing Guidelines place an emphasis on the 
exercise of due diligence and the promotion of an ethical organizational culture.42 
This emphasis is critical because a company’s compliance program is deeply 
interwoven with company culture.43 
Further, the Sentencing Guidelines detail seven requirements of an effective 
compliance program.44 First, organizations should establish standards and 
procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct.45 Second, a company’s senior 
management personnel should be knowledgeable about the company’s compliance 
issues and should put mechanisms in place to ensure the company develops its’ 
culture with an appreciation for the value of ethical conduct.46 Third, companies 
should exercise proper screening and due diligence in their hiring practices, 
especially for management positions.47 Fourth, organizations must effectively and 
practically communicate to their employees the standards and procedures established 
by the company.48 Fifth, compliance programs must ensure that their compliance and 
ethics standards and procedures are followed.49 This may be accomplished through 
various means including monitoring and auditing to prevent and detect criminal 
misconduct.50 Sixth, companies should ensure that their compliance and ethics 
programs are enforced consistently throughout the organization.51 This includes 
proper incentives for compliant performance and disciplinary measures for 
compliance failures.52 Lastly, organizations must have remedial measures in place 
for compliance failures that occur.53 
An additional source of guidance for evaluating compliance programs is 
information provided in FCPA settlement and plea agreements between alleged 
                                                          
42 Id. 
43 Brian S. Haney, Ethics Pitfalls in Mergers, Acquisitions, NAT’L DEF. MAG. (June 13, 2017), 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/6/13/ethic-pitfalls-in-mergers-acquisitions. 






50 Id.; see also Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018). 
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corporate wrongdoers and the DOJ or SEC. For instance, in 2012 Pfizer H.C.P. 
Corporation (“Pfizer”) entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) with 
the DOJ for violating the FCPA.54 Pfizer made numerous improper payments to 
government officials in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia.55 Pfizer made 
these payments to improperly influence government decisions regarding the 
approval and regulation of Pfizer pharmaceutical products.56 In sum, Pfizer paid 
more than $2 million in fines and reaped more than $7 million in profits as a result 
of its bribes.57 However, these improper payments resulted in a $15 million dollar 
fine levied against Pfizer.58 Pfizer’s DPA required a complete overhaul of the 
company’s FCPA compliance program and included nine specific minimum 
elements: 
1. A clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of the FCPA. 
2. Promulgation of compliance standards and procedures designed to reduce 
the prospect of violations of the FCPA. 
3. The assignment of a senior executive to be responsible for the 
implementation of the new compliance program. 
4. Implementation of mechanisms designed to ensure that the policies and 
procedures of the new program are clearly communicated to employees. 
5. The creation of an effective reporting system for suspected compliance 
failures or criminal conduct. 
6. The application of appropriate disciplinary procedures to address FCPA 
compliance violations. 
7. The implementation of proper due diligence policies for Pfizer’s business 
partners. 
8. The implementation of standard contractual terms in all agreements 
designed to protect against violations of the FCPA. 
                                                          
54 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P., No. 1:12CR00169 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 7, 2012). 
55 STAN. L. SCH., Case Information, United State v. Pfizer H.C.P., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
CLEARINGHOUSE: A COLLABORATION WITH SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/ 
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9. Periodic testing of the new compliance program.59 
Another example of a settlement agreement which provides guidance for 
compliance programs is the guilty plea agreement between BAE Systems (“BAE”) 
and the DOJ. In 2010, BAE pleaded guilty to making false statements regarding its 
FCPA program.60 BAE’s misconduct began in 2000, when BAE engaged in 
significant expansion into the United States market.61 As part of that expansion, BAE 
represented to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) and DOJ that it would create a 
compliance program to ensure that its domestic and international business operations 
would conform to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.62 Yet, in 2002 rumors 
began circulating that BAE had been awarded contracts for fighter jets with several 
Eastern European countries through bribing public officials.63 As a result of these 
rumors, the DOD asked for BAE’s assurance that BAE had complied with the FCPA 
anti-bribery provisions in procuring the awards.64 In response, BAE stated that it had 
reformed its business practices and implemented sufficient mechanisms to ensure 
that all of its businesses were operating in compliance with the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA.65 However, this was false.66 
BAE’s guilty plea agreement imposed a $400,000,400 fine against BAE, one 
of the largest fines ever levied under the FCPA.67 BAE’s plea agreement with the 
DOJ required BAE to implement and maintain a compliance program that includes 
a system of internal accounting controls designed to ensure BAE makes and keeps 
fair and accurate books, records, and accounts; a rigorous anti-corruption compliance 
code; and standards and procedures designed to detect and deter violations of the 
                                                          
59 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 54. 
60 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and 
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/ 
case/united-states-v-bae-systems-plc-court-docket-number-10-cr-035-jdb. See also Trial Motion, 
Memorandum and Affadavit, United States of America v. BAE Systems PLC, No. 1:10CR035 (D.D.C. 
Feb. 22, 2010). 
61 Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, supra note 60. 
62 Id. 
63 STAN. L. SCH., Case Information, United States of America v. BAE Systems PLC, FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES CLEARINGHOUSE: A COLLABORATION WITH SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, 
http://fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcement-action.html?id=295 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
64 Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, supra note 60. 
65 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., supra note 60. 
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FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws.68 Further, BAE agreed to secure the 
services of an independent monitor of the program for a three-year period to ensure 
the effective implementation of the compliance program.69 According to the plea 
agreement, the monitor’s primary responsibility is to assess and monitor BAE’s 
compliance with the terms of the plea agreement and specifically reduce the risk of 
any recurrence of BAE’s misconduct, including an evaluation of BAE’s FCPA 
compliance.70 
The United States Attorneys Manual Insert on FCPA Corporate Enforcement 
Policy (“Enforcement Policy”) is a fifth source of guidance for FCPA compliance 
programs.71 The Enforcement Policy is aimed at providing additional benefits to 
companies based upon their behavior after discovering misconduct.72 Indeed, if a 
company behaves in accordance with the Enforcement Policy following the 
discovery of a compliance failure, the DOJ will recommend a 50% reduction off the 
low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range, with limited exception.73 The 
Enforcement Policy requires that companies implement an effective compliance and 
ethics program to receive the benefits of the Enforcement Policy.74 Further, the 
Enforcement Policy defines several criteria to illustrate the properties of an effective 
compliance program.75 These criteria include: employee awareness of company 
compliance policies and procedures, the dedication of adequate resources to 
compliance, the quality and experience of compliance personnel, the authority and 
independence of the company’s compliance function, auditing of the company’s 
compliance function; appropriate disciplinary procedures for compliance failures, 
appropriate retention of business records, and any additional steps to demonstrate a 
company’s commitment to promoting and maintaining a culture of respect for 
compliance and ethics.76 
These five sources of guidance may be used by firms to inform decision making 
when developing a corporate compliance and ethics program. Further, by drawing 
                                                          
68 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., Fraud Section, to Lawrence Byrne, Esq., Counsel 
for BAE Systems PLC (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/ 
2011/02/16/03-01-10baesystems-plea-agree.pdf. 
69 Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit, supra note 60. 
70 Id. 
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on multiple sources of guidance, firms can develop robust compliance programs 
tailored to their individual needs. Indeed, firms can proactively insulate themselves 
from the liability risks associated with compliance failure in a cost-efficient manner 
by focusing on the criteria analyzed by the DOJ, SEC, federal prosecutors, and courts 
in developing and maintaining their compliance and ethics programs. 
II. QUALITY MEASUREMENT ALGORITHM 
Part I of this Article explored five sources of guidance for measuring the quality 
and effectiveness of a compliance program. Part II consolidates the information from 
the five sources of guidance in Part I to develop an algorithm for the measurement 
of compliance program quality. 
Quality Metrics 
Quality metrics are measurement tools that enable subjective quality 
assessment to be measured within a formalized framework.77 In this context quality 
is not a single idea, but rather a multidimensional concept, which includes an entity 
and the measurable quality factors of that entity.78 And, the ability to measure quality 
is critical to the modernization of in-house legal departments, compliance 
departments, and law firms because it facilitates the improvement of efficiency and 
performance.79 Further, quality metrics present a framework that facilitates a more 
direct mapping of the reasons behind expert analysis.80 Indeed, quality metrics seek 
to uncover the reasons for expert scores and model them accordingly.81 
Several quality factors are important and must be combined to develop an 
overall quality assessment for a particular entity when measuring quality in any given 
situation.82 Additionally, quality metric analysis allows for the discovery of strengths 
and weaknesses at both the macro and component level.83 However, quality metrics 
must do three things to be effective. First, quality metrics must be practical and 
                                                          
77 Ron Dolin, Measuring Legal Quality (June 18, 2017) (unpublished), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2988647. 
78 STEPHEN H. KAHN, METRICS AND MODELS IN SOFTWARE QUALITY ENGINEERING 1 (2d ed. 
2002). 
79 See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 83 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 
2017). 
80 Dolin, supra note 77. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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implementable to the parties expected to produce them.84 Second, quality metrics 
must be objective, transparent, mathematical measurements.85 Third, quality metrics 
must correlate to the consumer’s subjective interpretation of quality.86 Ultimately, 
the main objective of implementing quality assessment metrics is to develop 
measures that are consistent with subjective evaluation.87 
The goal of a compliance program evaluation is to assess the quality of the 
compliance program and to identify areas of improvement to prevent future 
misconduct.88 However, this task is difficult without a proper framework for 
evaluation. Organizations and agencies will be able to evaluate compliance programs 
in a more cost-efficient manner by establishing a standard set of compliance program 
quality metrics.89 Hence, once a set of compliance quality factors are defined, a 
human indexer may then evaluate each of the factors independently based on her 
professional experience.90 Scoring mechanisms may then be put in place to 
mathematically model and calculate the quality of a compliance program. The 
compliance program evaluation process is describable algorithmically, simplifying 
and standardizing the evaluation process. 
Algorithm for Compliance Program Evaluation 
Generally, an algorithm is a sequence of instructions executed to transform 
some input of information to an output of information.91 In the context of compliance 
program evaluation, the goal of quality measurement algorithms is to define input 
criteria as objectively as possible, and to transform that input information into a 
useful output informing human decision makers in their evaluation processes. This 
part of the Article draws on the sources of guidance in Part I, as well as the basic 
principles of quality metrics to present an algorithm for the evaluation of corporate 
compliance programs. 
                                                          




88 See generally Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (2016). 
89 Dolin, supra note 77. 
90 James D. Anderson & José Pérez-Carballo, The Nature of Indexing: How Humans and Machines 
Analyze Messages and Texts for Retrieval. Part I: Research, and the Nature of Human Indexing, 37 INFO. 
PROCESSING & MGMT. 231, 254 (2001). 
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The first step in the algorithm is selecting the relevant evaluation factors.92 The 


























These nine factors are largely derived from the Filip Factors outline in the DOJ 
memo.93 
The second step is weighting the defined evaluation factors based on their 
relative importance.94 Indeed, each evaluation factor may not be considered equal in 
an overall evaluation of a compliance program. So, each factor may be raised to an 
exponent greater than or equal to one to represent its relative importance among the 
other evaluation factors. For example, suppose Senior and Middle Management and 
Third Party Management are particularly important in a specific evaluation. In that 
case, those important factors should be weighted to an exponent of 2, while the other 
factors are raised to an exponent of 1. The table below illustrates the hypothetical 
weighting of the nine defined factors that should be considered in evaluating 




























The third step is developing a normalized scoring system.95 The goal of the 
scoring system is to score each evaluation factor independently.96 This allows for a 
compliance program to be analyzed at the component level.97 Each evaluation factor 
                                                          
92 Dolin, supra note 77. 
93 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
94 Id. 
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should be scored in terms of the number of evaluation factor criteria the compliance 
program satisfies. The evaluation factor criteria must be measureable and may be 
reflective of tangible qualities. The table below draws upon the sources of guidance 
described in Part I and includes a list of five evaluation factor criteria for each 
evaluation factor to measure compliance programs: 
Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Remediation of Underlying Conduct 1. The company has written procedures 
to identify and analyze the root cause 
of misconduct when it occurs; and 
the company has demonstrated that it 
follows those procedures.98 
2. The company has written procedures 
to identify and analyze systematic 
compliance issues; and the company 
has demonstrated that it follows 
those procedures.99 
3. The company has written procedures 
to determine who in the company is 
involved root cause analysis for 
compliance issues; and the company 
has demonstrated that it follows 
those procedures.100 
4. The company has written procedures 
to detect and address allegations of 
misconduct; and the company has 
demonstrated that it follows those 
procedures.101 
5. The company has written procedures 
that require specific changes be 
made to reduce the risk of similar 
misconduct after misconduct occurs; 
and the company has demonstrated 
that it follows those procedures.102 
                                                          
98 U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL INSERT, supra note 71. 
99 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
100 U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL INSERT, supra note 71. 
101 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40. 





CALCULATING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
Volume XIX – 2018-2019 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 











Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Senior and Middle Management 1. The company has written procedures 
that require action to educate senior 
and middle management on company 
policies and procedures; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.103 
2. The company has written procedures 
that mandate board review of 
relevant information of misconduct; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.104 
3. The company has written procedures 
that provide incentive for senior 
management to provide leadership to 
engage in model behaviors in 
compliance; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.105 
4. The company has written procedures 
that provide for specific actions by 
senior management that demonstrate 
a commitment to compliance; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.106 
5. The company has written procedures 
that require meetings between 
compliance professionals, senior 
management, and the board on a 
quarterly basis; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.107 
                                                          
103 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40. 
104 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
105 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
106 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Autonomy and Resources 1. The company has written procedures 
that require the maintenance of a 
comprehensive compliance program 
and training for all potential 
misconduct; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.108 
2. The company has written procedures 
that require due diligence 
investigation prior to the hiring of 
new employees; and the company 
has demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.109 
3. The company has written procedures 
for when to outsource compliance 
functions to an external firm; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.110 
4. The company has written procedures 
to ensure that compliance personnel 
have the appropriate experience and 
qualifications for their roles; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.111 
5. The company has written procedures 
that discourage prohibited conduct; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.112 
 
  
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40. 
110 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
111 U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL INSERT, supra note 71. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Training and Communications 1. The company has written procedures 
to train employees in relevant control 
and compliance functions annually; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.113 
2. The company has written procedures 
to measure the effectiveness of 
compliance functions annually; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.114 
3. The company has written procedures 
to make company policies and 
procedures readily available to 
employees; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.115 
4. The company has written procedures 
for communications with terminated 
employees; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.116 
5. The company has written procedures 
to conduct employee specific 
analysis and training; and the 




                                                          
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Reporting and Investigation 1. The company has written procedures 
to handle information obtained 
through reporting mechanisms; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.118 
2. The company has written procedures 
regarding the assessment of the 
severity of different allegations; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.119 
3. The company has written procedures 
that ensure that investigations are 
independent, properly scoped, 
objective, properly documented, and 
appropriately conducted; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.120 
4. The company has written procedures 
for responding to investigative 
findings that go all the way up to 
senior management and board; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.121 
5. The company has written procedures 
to allow the compliance function full 
access to information involved in the 
reporting and investigatory process; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.122 
 
                                                          
118 U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL INSERT, supra note 71. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Incentives and Disciplinary Measures 1. The company has written procedures 
for disciplinary actions that the 
company takes in response to 
compliance violations; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.123 
2. The company has written procedures 
that incentivize compliant and ethical 
behavior; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.124 
3. The company has written procedures 
that hold managers accountable for 
misconduct that happens under their 
supervision; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.125 
4. The company has written procedures 
that require the fair and consistent 
application of disciplinary 
procedures; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.126 
5. The company has written procedures 
that strictly discipline repeat 
offenders; and the company has 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Improvement, Testing, and Review 1. The company has written procedures 
to collect and analyze compliance 
data; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.128 
2. The company has written procedures 
to audit procedures to identify and 
prevent misconduct; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.129 
3. The company has written procedures 
that require the review and 
amendment of compliance policies 
and procedures on an annual basis; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.130 
4. The company has written procedures 
for the board and management to 
follow up on audit results; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.131 
5. The company has written procedures 
to audit high-risk areas on a regular 
basis; and the company has 




                                                          
128 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
129 U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL INSERT, supra note 71. 
130 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
131 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Third Party Management 1. The company has written procedures 
for merger and acquisition due 
diligence; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.133 
2. The company has written procedures 
that incentivize third parties to 
behave ethically; and the company 
has demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.134 
3. The company has written procedures 
to identify and resolve red flags 
found in due diligence research of 
third parties; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.135 
4. The company has written procedures 
to suspend, terminate, or audit third 
parties as a result of compliance 
failures; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.136 
5. The company has written procedures 
for training relationship managers 
about compliance risks and 
compliance risk management; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.137 
 
                                                          
133 Id. 
134 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P., No. 1:12CR00169 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 7, 2012). 
135 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
136 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
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Evaluation Factor Evaluation Factor Criteria 
Bribery and Accounting 1. The company has written procedures 
that ensure that contract payment 
terms are appropriate; and the 
company has demonstrated it follows 
those procedures.138 
2. The company has written procedures 
to ensure that compensation is 
commensurate with the services 
rendered; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.139 
3. The company has written procedures 
that ensure that contract terms 
specifically describe the services to 
be performed; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.140 
4. The company has written procedures 
to ensure that books and records 
accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions of the corporation; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures.141 
5. The company has written procedures 
to devise and maintain an adequate 
system of internal accounting 
controls; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures.142 
                                                          
138 Id. 
139 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (West 1998). 
140 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
141 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 1978). 
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This table is meant to be illustrative and may be adapted, updated, or changed before 
implementation. 
The fourth step in the algorithm is for a human indexer to gather and record 
evaluation information for each of the evaluation factors.143 To do this, the human 
indexer must score each evaluation factor based upon the number of evaluation factor 
criteria an organization’s compliance program satisfies. The table below illustrates 
hypothetical results for the Remediation of Underlying Conduct evaluation factor: 
Remediation of Underlying Conduct Satisfied (Yes = 1 and No = 0) 
1. The company has written procedures 
to identify and analyze the root cause 
of misconduct when it occurs; and 
the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures. 
1 
2. The company has written procedures 
to identify and analyze systematic 
compliance issues; and the company 
has demonstrated it follows those 
procedures. 
1 
3. The company has written procedures 
to determine who in the company is 
involved root cause analysis for 
compliance issues; and the company 
has demonstrated it follows those 
procedures. 
0 
4. The company has written procedures 
to detect and address allegations of 
misconduct; and the company has 
demonstrated it follows those 
procedures. 
1 
5. The company has written procedures 
that require specific changes be 
made to reduce the risk of similar 
misconduct after misconduct occurs; 
and the company has demonstrated it 
follows those procedures. 
1 
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Each evaluation factor may then be given a score calculated by dividing the number 
of satisfied evaluation factor criteria by the total number of evaluation factor criteria. 
So, in the hypothetical above, the Remediation of Underlying Conduct evaluation 
factor would receive a score of .800; calculated as 4, the number of satisfied 
evaluation factor criteria, divided by 5, the total number of evaluation factor criteria. 
Calculating a weighted geometric mean for the compliance program is the fifth 
step.144 The weighted geometric mean allows the algorithm to produce an overall 
score that when measured on a relative basis, is well suited to capture human intuition 
in quality analysis.145 The weighted geometric mean represents an overall evaluation 
of a company’s compliance program in a numerical score from zero to one.146 The 
weighted geometric mean calculation can be described formally with the equation:147 
=  ∑  
In the above equation C is the overall compliance score. Additionally, n 
represents the number of evaluation factors, Fi, and Wi, is the per factor weight.148 
The square root is a summation equation designed to calculate the total weight for 
all of the factors. In other words, the equation above represents a mathematically 
formalistic way of expressing that the product of all the weighted factors is calculated 
and is then squared to the nth root, where n is the sum of the exponents of all the 
factors.149 For illustrative purposes the table below includes hypothetical scores for 
a compliance program: 
Evaluation Factor Score 
Remediation of Underlying Conduct .8001 
Senior and Middle Management .6002 
Autonomy and Resources .4001 
Training and Communications 11 
Reporting and Investigation 11 
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Evaluation Factor Score 
Incentives and Disciplinary Measures .8001 
Improvement, Testing and Review .2001 
Third Party Management .8002 
Bribery and Accounting 11 
Using the information in the table above, the company’s compliance score could be 
calculated in the following way: = . 8 × .6 × .6 × .4 × 1 × 1 × .8 × .2 × .8 × .8 × 1  
So, in this example the company’s overall compliance score is .668. Practically 
applied, the closer a compliance score is to 1, the better the quality of the compliance 
program. Conversely, the closer the compliance score is to 0, the lower the quality 
of the compliance program. For example, a compliance program with a score of .808 
is of better quality than a compliance program with a score of .556. 
Properties 
The algorithm uses the weighted geometric mean to calculate the compliance 
score as opposed to an arithmetic mean, coefficient variables, addition, or another 
method of score determination due the geometric mean’s properties.150 The 
algorithm includes seven distinct properties as a result of the weighted geometric 
mean calculation.151 These properties are designed to reflect properties of human 
intuition in decision making.152 The first property that the algorithm includes is an 
ordered ranking that balances trade-offs between various criteria.153 Next is the 
property that the algorithm is heterogeneous because it is able to accommodate and 
combine different types of data.154 The third property that the algorithm includes is 
a filter property; which means that if any evaluation factor receives a score of zero, 
the total score is zero.155 The filter property allows for the identification of 
unacceptable compliance for any one evaluation factor. Normalized scoring is the 
                                                          
150 Id. 
151 Larry Hardesty, System That Replaces Human Intuition with Algorithms Outperforms Human 
Teams (Oct. 16, 2015), http://news.mit.edu/2015/automating-big-data-analysis-1016. 
152 Dolin, supra note 77. 
153 Id. 
154 See generally RAY KURZWEIL, HOW TO CREATE A MIND 131 (2012). 
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fourth property that the algorithm includes.156 In other words, all factors are assigned 
a normalized score between 0 and 1.157 Fifth, the algorithm includes a hierarchy 
property.158 Hierarchical scoring allows sub-scores to be derived and treated as 
atomic scores, or for atomic scores to be decomposed into smaller elements without 
impacting the way the characteristic is used.159 The sixth property that the algorithm 
includes is a linear diagonal.160 The linear diagonal allows any two factors 
relationship to be graphed along a diagonal of a plot.161 Finally, the seventh property 
that the algorithm includes is weightability, meaning it can account for the relative 
importance of each factor of consideration.162 In sum, these seven properties allow 
for the algorithm to model human intuition in quality analysis.163 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS 
The former compliance counsel at the DOJ has repeatedly commented on the 
lack of internal assessment and data generation by organizations with regard to their 
internal compliance efforts.164 Indeed, it is critical firms begin to change their 
approach to compliance to maximize the cost-efficiency with which they operate. 
Compliance programs are tasked with serving three distinct functions within an 
organization. Prevention is the first function, which involves the company’s actions 
to prevent compliance failures from occurring within the organization.165 Second is 
detection, which involves the organization’s actions aimed at identifying 
misconduct, risks, or errors.166 The third function is remediation, which involves an 
organization’s strategies for responding to and recovering from misconduct.167 
Executing these three functions requires the work of multiple compliance personnel 
working together to ensure the effective pursuit of a corporation’s compliance goals. 
                                                          
156 See generally Donald McAlister, The Law of the Geometric Mean, 29 PROC. R. SOC’Y LOND. 
367, 368 (1879). 
157 Dolin, supra note 77. 
158 KURZWEIL, supra note 154. 
159 Dolin, supra note 77. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 McAlister, supra note 156, at 375. 
163 Dolin, supra note 77. 
164 Hui Chen, A Tale of Two Data Sets, CORP. ON BLOOMBERG L. (BNA) (Apr. 23, 2018). 
165 Root, supra note 50, at 18. 
166 Id. at 20. 
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Companies can use the algorithm provided in Part II to improve each of the 
three functions compliance programs serve. Organizations can use the algorithm to 
improve the prevention function because the algorithm includes proactive solutions 
to prevent compliance failures: the evaluation factor criteria. The evaluation factor 
criteria were derived from the five sources of guidance discussed in Part I. Therefore, 
the algorithm measures the quality of a compliance program based upon the key 
factors that the DOJ and courts consider in their evaluations of compliance programs. 
Further, companies can use the algorithm to implement preventative compliance 
procedures designed specifically to improve the key factors that DOJ and courts use 
to evaluate compliance programs. In other words, the evaluation factor criteria serve 
both as measurement tools and, when implemented, preventative compliance 
mechanisms. For example, if a company has a low score under the Senior and Middle 
Management factor, the company can identify the evaluation factor criteria it failed 
to satisfy. Then, the company can implement procedures associated with the 
unsatisfied criteria, on paper and in practice, to decrease the probability of a future 
compliance failure. Thus, a company can use the algorithm to directly improve its 
prevention function because the algorithm consolidates several sources of 
Government compliance guidance to include specific recommendations for 
preventative improvements. 
In addition, firms can use the algorithm presented in Part II to improve the 
detection function because the algorithm is designed to aid compliance officials in 
identifying areas of weakness in compliance programs. One reason that quality 
metrics are important to the algorithm is that they allow for analysis of compliance 
programs at the component level.168 Indeed, as stated in the DOJ memo, the 
evaluation factors divide a program into individual components and are modeled 
after the compliance program evaluation factors that the DOJ considers when 
evaluating compliance programs.169 This allows companies to analyze the specific 
components of their compliance program. 
The ability to analyze the specific components of a compliance program 
supports the detection function in two ways. First, analyzing specific procedures at 
the component level allows companies to detect weaknesses and high-risk areas in 
their compliance program. For example, if a company receives a relatively low score 
in the Senior and Middle Management evaluation factor, the algorithm has aided in 
detection of an area of compliance weakness and risk. Second, analyzing specific 
procedures at the component level helps companies ensure that their compliance 
program is not merely a paper program. The algorithm supports this analysis by 
requiring companies demonstrate they follow their written procedures to satisfy 
                                                          
168 Dolin, supra note 77. 
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individual evaluation factor criteria. Thus, the algorithm aids in the detection of 
employee behavior that is not in accordance with company procedure. 
In that respect, firms can use the algorithm to improve the remediation function 
proactively. As Professor Veronica Root argues, firms often act irrationally in the 
compliance space by acting reactively as opposed to proactively.170 And, while 
corporations may take steps to maximize their level of compliance with the FCPA, 
perfect compliance is impossible to assure.171 Thus, one critical role of compliance 
personnel is to minimize risk by ensuring the company is insulated from strict 
enforcement penalties in the event of a compliance failure.172 The most effective way 
for compliance personnel to meet this objective is to maintain an effective 
compliance program.173 For instance, the Principles of Prosecution require federal 
prosecutors to take account of the existence and effectiveness of a company’s pre-
existing compliance program when deciding whether to prosecute a corporate 
offender and during settlement discussions.174 Further, the Sentencing Guidelines 
provide that an effective compliance program is a mitigating factor in the punishment 
of corporate defendants.175 Hence, the most significant way in which firms can 
insulate themselves from liability under the FCPA, and for compliance failures 
generally, is to demonstrate a commitment to an ethical culture by developing a 
robust compliance program. Additionally, the algorithm presented in Part II provides 
a cost-efficient way for doing so. 
Therefore, the algorithm supports each of the three functions compliance 
programs serve. First, the algorithm supports the prevention function by including 
proactive solutions to prevent compliance failures. Next, the algorithm supports the 
detection function by facilitating compliance officials’ ability to analyze the specific 
components of a compliance program. Finally, the algorithm supports the 
remediation function by proactively aiding the program’s effectiveness. Further, the 
evaluation factor criteria support each of these three functions indirectly. For 
example, the remediation function is improved if a company implements the 
evaluation factor criteria: “The company has written procedures to identify and 
analyze the root cause of misconduct when it occurs; and the company has 
                                                          
170 Root, supra note 1. 
171 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
172 See generally SUSSKIND, supra note 79. 
173 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
174 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
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demonstrated that it follows those procedures.”176 Thus, a compliance program that 
has written procedures in place to identify and analyze the root cause of misconduct 
when it occurs and is able to demonstrate that it follows those procedures is more 
likely to receive favorable treatment if under investigation by the DOJ.177 
The algorithm presented in Part II takes account of the specific considerations 
that prosecutors are required to consider under the Principles of Prosecution. For 
example, prosecutors should consider whether a compliance program is legitimate 
or merely a paper program.178 The algorithm takes account of this consideration by 
requiring that companies demonstrate that they follow their procedures to satisfy 
evaluation factor criteria.179 Additionally, the algorithm takes account of the seven 
detailed requirements of an effective compliance program defined in the Sentencing 
Guidelines. For instance, the Sentencing Guidelines require effective compliance 
programs exercise proper due diligence and screening in their hiring practices.180 
And, the algorithm takes account of this requirement under the Autonomy and 
Resources evaluation factor by including the evaluation factor criteria: “[t]he 
company has written procedures that require due diligence investigation prior to the 
hiring of new employees; and the company has demonstrated that it follows those 
procedures.”181 Therefore, while companies cannot use the algorithm to ensure 
perfect compliance; companies can use the algorithm to ensure that if a compliance 
failure does occur, the DOJ will work with the company, instead of against it during 
the remediation process. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizations with complex corporate structures should adopt strategies for 
developing comprehensive compliance processes that aggregate data across 
information silos.182 Indeed, the purpose of the algorithm provided in this Article 
seeks to serve exactly that goal: improving firm compliance generally by allowing 
firms to structure their compliance data in a standardized format. Further, the 
algorithm allows for data to be collected, structured, and analyzed, so that firms can 
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more specifically monitor their compliance efforts and correlate those efforts with 
firm performance. 
Importantly, the algorithm also supports the cost efficiency of corporate 
compliance programs by utilizing a framework based upon the Government’s 
published sources of compliance guidance.183 Following this framework allows 
companies to target their compliance spending and direct resources at the factors that 
are most important to the Government, which supports the maximization of cost-
effective risk reduction. In sum, Part I provided insight into sources of guidance the 
DOJ and courts use when evaluating the effectiveness of a corporate compliance 
program. Part II introduced an algorithm that firms can use to support compliance 
program analysis. Part III described how the algorithm can be used by organizations 
to maximize compliance cost-efficiency by improving the compliance functions of 
prevention, detection, and remediation. 
  
                                                          
183 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 40; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 





CALCULATING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
Volume XIX – 2018-2019 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 




































J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIX – 2018-2019 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 




































CALCULATING CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
Volume XIX – 2018-2019 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










Appendix B: Total Monetary Sanctions Adjusted for Inflation 
Year Total Monetary Sanctions 2017 Adjusted Value 
2017 953,820,120 953,820,120 
2016 2,434,118,479 2,484,617,239 
2015 173,055,788 177,934,709 
2014 1,575,067,421 1,631,724,133 
2013 770,883,375 810,605,855 
2012 290,548,285 310,838,976 
2011 511,522,338 563,456,631 
2010 1,840,671,027 2,113,880 
2009 808,198,909 928,159,327 
2008 897,508,450 1,031,667,238 
2007 156,586,705 187,339,154 
2006 73,309,777 89,935,500 
2005 60,533,574 76,798,433 
2004 29,473,407 38,610,003 
2003 4,201,931 5,607,963 
2002 3,213,598 4,390,862 
2001 161,175 223,637 
2000 1,144,200 1,641,393 
1999 18,905,200 278,484,201 
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Year Total Monetary Sanctions 2017 Adjusted Value 
1997 385,000 586,073 
1996 300,000 471,854 
1995 0 0 
1994 26,707,178 44,224,742 
1993 50 85 
1992 68,500,800 119,929,551 
1991 0 0 
1990 235,000 449,932 
1989 1,850,700 3,708,034 
1988 10,000 20,921 
1987 0 0 
1986 0 0 
1985 235,000 538,808 
1984 0 0 
1983 545,000 1,348,160 
1982 4,824,000 12,390,084 
1981 539,512 1,509,333 
1980 0 0 
1979 50,000 178,310 
1978 0 0 
 
